The relationship between attitudes and behaviour
Once
we've established people's attitudes, can we then accurately predict how
they'll behave? Rosenberg & HovIand's (1960) three‑components model
(The ABC model: affective – behavioural
– cognitive) implies that the behavioural component will be highly correlated
with the cognitive and affective components.
An
early study which shows the inconsistency
of attitudes and behaviour is that of LaPiere (1934).
LaPiere’s study
Beginning
in 1930 and for the next two years, LaPiere travelled around the
However,
when each of the 251 establishments visited was sent a letter six months later
asking: 'Will you accept members of the Chinese race as guests in your establishment?',
91 per cent of the 128 which responded gave an emphatic 'No'. One establishment
gave an unqualified 'Yes' and the rest said 'Undecided: depends upon
circumstances'.
Influences on
behaviour
It's
generally agreed that attitudes form only one determinant of behaviour. They
represent predispositions to behave
in particular ways, but how we actually act in a particular situation will
depend on the immediate consequences of our behaviour, how we think others will
evaluate our actions, and habitual ways of behaving in those kinds of
situations. In addition, there may be specific situational factors influencing behaviour. For example, in the
LaPiere study, the high quality of his Chinese friends' clothes and luggage and
their politeness, together with the presence of LaPiere himself, may have made
it more difficult to show overt prejudice. Thus, sometimes we experience a
conflict of attitudes, and behaviour may represent a compromise between them.
Compatibility
between attitudes and behaviour
The
same attitude may be expressed in a variety of ways. For example, having a
positive attitude towards the Labour Party doesn't necessarily mean that you
actually become a member, or that you attend public meetings. But if you don't
vote Labour in a general election, people may question your attitude. In other
words, an attitude should predict behaviour to some extent, even if this is
extremely limited and specific.
Indeed,
Azjen & Fishbein (1977) argue that attitudes can predict behaviour,
provided that both are assessed at the same level of generality. There needs to
be a high degree of compatibility (or
correspondence) between them. They
argue that much of the earlier research (LaPiere's study included) suffered
from either trying to predict specific behaviours from general attitudes, or
vice versa, and this accounts for the generally low correlations. A study by
Davidson and Jaccard tried to overcome this limitation.
Attitudes can predict behaviour
if you ask the right questions (Davidson & Jaccard, 1979) Davidson and Jaccard analysed
correlations between married women's attitudes towards birth control
and their actual use of oral contraceptives during the two years following the
study.
When
'attitude towards birth control' was used as the attitude measure, the correlation was 0.08. Clearly, the
correspondence here was very low. But when 'attitudes towards oral
contraceptives' were measured, the correlation rose to 0.32, and when
'attitudes towards using oral contraceptives' were measured, the correlation
rose still further to 0.53. Finally, when 'attitudes towards using oral
contraceptives during the next two years' was used, it rose still further, to
0.57. Clearly, in the last three cases, correspondence was much higher.
According
to Ajzen and Fishbein, every single instance of behaviour involves four
specific elements:
a specific action
performed with respect to a
given target
in a given context
at a given point in time.
According
to the principle of compatibility, measures
of attitude and behaviour are compatible to the extent that the target, action,
context and time element are assessed at identical levels of generality or
specificity (Ajzen, 1988).
For
example, a person's attitude towards a 'healthy lifestyle' only specifies the
target, leaving the other three unspecified. A behavioural measure that would
be compatible with this global attitude would have to aggregate a wide range of
health behaviour across different contexts and times (Stroebe, 2000). Elaborating the psychological processes
underlying the principle of compatibility, Ajzen (1996) suggested that to:
'... the extent that the beliefs salient at the
time of attitude assessment are also
salient when plans are formulated or executed, strong attitude‑behaviour
correlations are expected'.
The reliability
and consistency of behaviour
Many
of the classic studies which failed to find an attitude‑behaviour
relationship assessed just single
instances of behaviour (Stroebe, 2000). As we noted earlier when discussing
the LaPiere study, behaviour depends on many factors in addition to the
attitude. This makes a single instance of behaviour an unreliable indicator of
an attitude Jonas et al., 1995). Only
by sampling many instances of the behaviour will the influence of specific
factors 'cancel out'. This aggregation
principle (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974) has been demonstrated in a number of
studies.
According
to Hogg & Vaughan (1995), what has emerged in the 1980s and 1990s is a view
that attitudes and overt behaviour aren't related in a simple one‑to‑one
fashion. In order to predict someone's behaviour, it must be possible to
account for the interaction between
attitudes, beliefs and behavioural intentions, as well as how all of these
connect with the later action. One attempt to formalise these links is the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen
& Fishbein, 1970; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). This is discussed in
relation to health behaviour in Chapter 12.
The strength of
attitudes
Most
modern theories agree that attitudes are represented in memory, and that an
attitude's accessibility can exert a strong influence on behaviour (Fazio,
1986: see Chapter 17). By definition, strong attitudes exert more influence
over behaviour, because they can be automatically activated. One factor that
seems to be important is direct experience. For example, Fazio & Zanna
(1978) found that measures of students' attitudes towards psychology
experiments were better predictors of their future participation if they'd
already taken part in several experiments than if they'd only read about them.
This can be explained by the mere
exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968), according to which the more contact we have
with something or somebody, the more we like them (see Chapter 28).
So attitudes
don't predict behaviour: what's the problem? The so‑called attitude‑behaviour problem,
that is, the failure to find a reliable relationship between attitudes and
behaviour, threatened to undermine the entire study of attitudes. As we saw in
the Introduction and overview, attitude
research was a cornerstone of social psychology in general, and social
cognition in particular, for much of their history (Stainton Rogers et al., 1995).
But from the perspective of discursive psychology, there's no reason to expect such a
correlation: inconsistency between attitudes and behaviour is what we'd expect
to find. Traditional, mainstream, attitude research is based on the fallacy of individualism (see Chapter 3), according
to which attitudes 'belong' to individuals. This implies something fairly
constant, and which is expressed and reflected in behaviour. From a discursive
perspective, attitudes are versions of the world that are constructed by people in the course of their interactions with
others.
Discursive psychology is concerned with action, as distinct from cognition. In
saying or writing things, people are performing actions, whose nature can in revealed
through a detailed study of the discourse (e.g. recordings of everyday
conversations, newspaper articles, TV programmes). Social psychologists have
underestimated the centrality of conflict
in social life; an analysis of rhetoric
highlights the point that people's versions of events, and their own mental
life, are part of ongoing arguments, debates and dialogues (Billig, 1987, 1992, in Potter, 1996).
Compared with traditional attitude research, discursive
psychology tries to shift the focus away from single, isolated, individuals
towards interactions between individuals and groups, a more relational or distributed focus (Potter, 1996).